














|
|
|
Monkey See, Monkey Do
By Christopher Ryan
As this review is being written, there is legislation pending in seven
states that would prohibit the teaching of evolutionary theory in
public schools. If humans were indeed created in the image of God, as
the anti-evolutionists insist, then God must look an awful lot like a
monkey, because people surely do. This is the obvious point the
anti-evolutionists seem desperate to deny.
In the past few decades, psychologists and other social scientists
have begun moving beyond questions of anatomy and applying Darwinian
insights to their investigations of human behavior. Evolutionary
Psychology has spawned its own critics, vehemently insisting that
although we may look like monkeys, we definitely don’t act like them!
But of course, we do. To be more specific, we sometimes act like
baboons, often like chimpanzees or orangutans and, if we’re lucky,
like bonobos – the most sexually liberated of the primates.
Occasionally, it is true, we have moments of near-enlightenment when
we respond to a situation using our most complex mental and spiritual
capacities. But far more often, our responses are grounded in the
millennia of programming that have gone into our brains and bodies.
If we feel threatened for example, we sweat, the heart races, pupils
dilate, what little body hair we still have stands on end, and so on –
even if we consciously know the threat exists only in our
imagination. Although we go to great lengths to convince ourselves
otherwise, we are undeniably primates and have as much in common with
the other great apes (both genetically and behaviorally) as dogs do
with wolves.
Although genetics is certainly in its infancy, it appears that the
study of the ways in which genes influence human behavior is moving
toward a difficult adolescence. Since its earliest days – when it was
known as sociobiology – evolutionary psychology has been
controversial. Why it took over a century for psychologists to begin
explicitly applying Darwinian principles to the investigation of the
origins and nature of human behavior is a complex, highly political
question. But whatever the cause of the delay, to many observers, a
century was too brief a wait. In one regrettable incident, E. O.
Wilson (author of Sociobiology and considered by many to be one of the
first to explore these matters) had a pitcher of ice-water dumped on
his head at a conference. One can only imagine that the protesters’
ire was fueled by some inner hunch that what Wilson was proposing was
too obvious not to be true. Wilson may have been “all wet”, as the
protesters charged so graphically, but that didn’t change his rather
obvious point that human behavior must be impacted by the same sorts
of environmental factors influencing other animals. This is really no
more outlandish than the idea of evolution itself.
Critics of evolutionary psychology, like critics of evolution, tend to
be offended by the imagined contention that they are being told that
they are nothing more than animals. Of course, this is offensive only
if one has a very low opinion of “animals.” In reality, human
behavior all too often descends into realms far below those to which
any “animal” would sink. In any case, this is a false argument in
that evolutionary psychologists do not argue that we are merely slaves
to our inherited drives. In fact, we can respond to these drives in
many ways, ranging from outright repression or denial to using them as
motivation for artistic creativity. But however we respond, these
impulses remain deep within, urging us toward that option which is in
the best interest of the gene – if not always of the individual. As
we are seeing in genetic research in the medical realm, absolute
genetic destiny is very rare; most genes transmit tendencies or
vulnerabilities that can manifest in many different ways. Just as a
genetic predisposition toward diabetes can be lessened or neutralized
with modified behavior, gene-inspired tendencies toward certain types
of behavior (gambling, alcoholism, sexual promiscuity, etc.) can be
modified through conscious decisions. However, these modifications
are not without costs. And these costs are sometimes arguably far
greater than those incurred by the behavior itself. Moreover, the
ability to anticipate and outsmart ourselves in this way may be all we
have left to distinguish ourselves from the other inhabitants of this
planet, for better or worse.
In the past few years, dozens of books explaining the principles of
evolutionary psychology have been published, of varying quality. To
my mind, The Moral Animal (1994) by Robert Wright still stands as the
best general introduction to the field published thus far. Wright
cleverly alternates chapters in which he outlines some insights into a
particular area of human behavior, followed by others in which he
applies these concepts to Darwin’s life. Thus, chapter 4 is “The
Marriage Market,” and chapter 5 is “Darwin’s Marriage.” So the reader
gets an education in evolutionary psychology while also having a peek
into Darwin’s personal life. Wright – a journalist who was a senior
editor at The New Republic, and currently writes a regular column in
the on-line magazine Slate.com – isn’t a scientist, and doesn’t write
like one. I don’t mean to disparage scientific writing by saying
this; However The Moral Animal is lots of fun to read because its
author is full of the enthusiasm of a recent convert, and is not the
least bit shy about showing it. And the enthusiasm is leavened with a
sometimes dry wit. In a discussion of the evolutionary origins of
jealousy, Wright suggests that, “for the average husband, the fact
that his wife inserted a diaphragm before copulating with her tennis
instructor will not be a major source of consolation” (p. 67).
Wright suggests that, “perhaps the primary promise of evolutionary
psychology is … to generate good theories of personality development.
In other words: evolutionary psychology can help us see not only the
‘knobs’ of human nature, but also how the knobs are tuned” (p. 82).
Authors Terry Burnham and Jay Phelan have recently published a book
that proposes to help readers to retune these knobs. The authors
claim that Mean Genes (2000) is the first book of applied evolutionary
psychology, an area that promises to be interesting and potentially
quite lucrative.
Mean Genes is a curious, and ultimately rather disturbing book. It is
entertaining, and marked by the same sort of enthusiastic wit one
finds in The Moral Animal. Although I agree with much of what the
authors had to say, I found the basic premise of the book – that we
are at war with ourselves – to be needlessly conflictive. While it is
true that, as mentioned above, and explained brilliantly by Richard
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976), the interests of our genes and our
own interests sometimes diverge, these are exceptional cases. This
conflict hardly calls for a “war on genes.” To hear Burnham and
Phelan tell it, we’re in big trouble from the get-go: “Battles for
self control are not defects of personality, nor can they be won in
the sense that the foe is vanquished. To take control of our lives,
we need perpetual vigilance and an understanding of the enemy within”
(p. 11). I don’t like being encouraged to think of myself as a
battleground. Nor do I agree that my genes are mean and that my life
is destined to be a never-ending struggle for control against this
satanic possession. Are we talking about genes or viruses?
Curiously, the authors never entertain the possibility that much of
the conflict between our desires (the “enemy”) and our intentions is
generated on a cultural level, rather than being something inherent in
the genes themselves. I found the book to be somewhat naïve in terms
of politics and culture. Throughout the book, there is an
unacknowledged bias in favor of the status quo. Nowhere in the
chapter on infidelity, for example, do the authors question whether
monogamy is a realistic expectation of the bonobo-like creatures that
we are. Rather, we are told that, “the temptations we all face are
deeply-ingrained in the genes of our hearts and minds, and both
parties should take steps to fight these mean genes” (p. 195). They
go on to suggest that couples listen to their phone messages together,
avoid seeing friends of the opposite sex, and so on. Leaving aside
whether or not such things as “genes of our hearts and minds” actually
exist, some discussion of ways in which relationships can be modified
to fit psychological reality seems essential. But all we’re offered
is the sort of advice that strikes this reader, at least, as being
somewhat infantile. This chapter ends on the same false note: “As
long as we remain interesting dynamos, there will be no conflict
between monogamy and our infidelity-promoting mean genes” (p. 195).
Really? So if a powerful middle-aged man has an affair with a young
woman – an intern, say – then this must be because his wife isn’t an
“interesting dynamo?” I don’t think so. And the problem is, the data
don’t support this perspective either. On the contrary, study after
study has demonstrated men and women simply approach and experience
their sexuality in very different ways. The point should be to use
evolutionary psychology to help us understand and accept ourselves and
each other, and not to escalate an already destructive situation.
Earlier in the same chapter, we are told that, “Because male
attractiveness is increased by wealth, men cheat most between the ages
of forty and sixty, when they finally have the opportunity. These are
their peak years of income. More than a third of the sex they have
during these two decades comes with women other than their spouses”
(p. 180). Here we have another example of the authors’ tendency to
present their own reading of the data as the data themselves. If this
is true – and it’s impossible to confirm this from the references
(more on that in a moment) – could we read these data differently? Is
it so obvious that men don’t get a chance to “cheat” until they’re in
their 40s, and that this is a function of income? And if it is true
that a higher percentage of male sexual activity takes place outside
of marriage later in life, couldn’t this be for other reasons having
more to do with having been married for several decades, as opposed to
economically-inspired “opportunity?” The admittedly distressing fact
of the matter is that male sexuality is highly oriented toward female
fertility – youth being one of the primary indicators of such
fertility. Telling a middle-aged woman that her husband of 30 years
is sexually attracted to a younger woman because his wife is no-longer
an “interesting dynamo” is not only a complete misreading of the
situation; it is tragically misguided advice on how to best resolve
it.
Also strange is the way the references were handled. In the
introduction, the authors tell us that “every fact has been
assiduously researched. There are more than a thousand citations,
verifying every aspect of the book.” We are then told that these
references haven’t been included because they “would fill more pages
than the text itself” – and we are directed to a web site to see the
notes. I went to the web site, downloaded all the reference notes,
and printed them. They filled 26 pages, including several full-page
photos (the book has 260 pages). Many of the “facts” I wanted to
verify were not cited in these notes at all. Others referred to
defunct web sites, or merely to huge studies. For example, the
contention I mention in the previous paragraph, that more than a third
of male sexual activity between the ages of 40 and 60 is outside
marriage, is referenced simply as The Kinsey Report. No page
numbers. To their credit, the authors responded promptly to my email
asking about these lapses, and provided me with some of the specific
references I was seeking. I was told that they haven’t had the time
to put the rest of the references on the web page, and as the notes
page is receiving about 1/100th the amount of traffic as the purchase
site, they didn’t think it was important.
This rather cavalier attitude toward providing references is all the
more distressing in light of the authors’ tendency to interpret the
data surreptitiously – consciously or not – and to present the most
extreme possible reading of these data. For example, in the chapter
on drugs, we are told that, “over the course of an addiction (heroin
addicts) may increase their dose ten-thousand-fold” (p. 72). I
checked this “fact” with about a dozen experts, ranging from drug
counselors to professors of psychopharmacology at major universities.
All agreed that this number is absurd – off by at least two orders of
magnitude. The works cited (not on the web page) are all secondary
sources. There are dozens of examples of this sort of sloppiness I
could mention.
I am distressed to be writing so negative a review of a book I wanted
so much to like. Before reading the book, I was impressed by the
authors’ responsiveness to my questions and I remain impressed by
their openness to my criticism. But the book feels unfinished (and as
far as the references go, it actually is unfinished). On the back
cover, we read that E. O. Wilson considers Mean Genes to be “brilliant
– well-grounded… delightfully readable.” I wish I could agree.
|
|